Misfortune caused by death, personal identity and what matters in survival
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26512/rbb.v16.2020.28300Palabras clave:
evil of death, personal identity, animalism, neo-Lockeanism, what matters in survivalResumen
This article presents and discusses concepts and arguments found in debates on three philosophical problems: the
misfortune inflicted by death on the person who dies; personal identity; and what is important in survival. First, it outlines the debate raised in the argument by Epicurus, to whom death means nothing to those who die. Second, the rivalry between neo-Lockeans and animalists regarding the most plausible criterion of personal identity is presented and discussed. Finally, a discussion on whether the misfortune caused by death is or not related to personal identity is conducted. The paper concludes that the dimension of the misfortune caused by death depends on both the amount of goods one is deprived of by death and on the interest such an individual would have to continue living. The aforementioned philosophical problems make up a core of acute issues such as decisions regarding the maintenance of life and delaying death.
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